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1. INTRODUCTION
A persistent worry about real-world democra-cies is the extent to which they allow some
individuals to exert disproportionate influence on
electoral and legislative processes, whether because
of wealth, gender, race, religion, education, or other
considerations. Inequalities in political influence
seem inconsistent with the equal concern and respect
that many political theorists now argue constitutes
the intrinsic value of democracy and legitimizes
coercion by the state. In order to satisfy the demands
of democratic legitimacy, then, it seems we must work
to eradicate inequalities of political influence wher-
ever possible.
Against this, democratic ‘‘pluralists’’ have long
argued that no real-world democracy can deliver
on such ideals of democratic legitimacy, and that
the attempt to do so will actually undermine our
valuable, though imperfect, existing democratic
institutions.1 The underlying problem is that politics
is always going to be an arena in which different
organized groups assert their interests against each
other, with sometimes messy results. Pluralists agree
with Madison that ‘‘that the causes of faction cannot
be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in
the means of controlling its effects.’’2 They thus
argue that while conflict cannot be eradicated, it
can be managed by a series of institutional checks
and balances that distribute power and provide con-
strained competitive fora. Basic democratic institu-
tions and procedures, including periodic elections
as well as freedoms of speech and association,
remain important in the pluralist picture. But plural-
ists argue that on any realistic democratic model,
individuals will have a voice largely through orga-
nized groups representing their interests. Managed
well, the conflict of interests can prevent any one
interest group from dominating others over the
long-term. But any hopes of achieving democratic
ideals like equality of political influence will be
thwarted by the realities of political life.
In Democracy More or Less: America’s Political
Reform Quandary, Bruce Cain offers a sophisti-
cated version of the Madisonian position, which
he calls ‘‘reform pluralism.’’3 Like other pluralists,
he argues that democratic legitimacy should not
be understood in terms of the achievement of
some democratic ideal but only in terms of satisfy-
ing basic democratic accountability requirements.
This is partly for theoretical reasons having to do
with the difficulty of articulating a single coherent
democratic ideal, and partly for the practical reason
that most significant reform efforts are bound to
have perverse effects on the democratic system
itself. Underlying these claims is a deep pessimism
about what it is reasonable to expect of the average
citizen in terms of public concern, intelligence, and
expertise. In slogan form, Cain concludes that more
democracy is not (likely to be) better democracy.
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His main practical conclusion is thus a skeptical one.
Despite widespread frustration about the American
political system, he argues, most ambitious demo-
cratic reform efforts are either ill conceived or any-
way bound to fail.
In these comments I want to explore the frame-
work underlying the ‘‘pluralist’’ approach in hopes
of making clearer how one might resist Cain’s skep-
tical practical conclusion. In section 2, I present in
more detail Cain’s reform pluralist argument for a
set of mid-level practical principles. In section 3, I
argue that, with regard to what might count as better
democracy for Cain, the most natural framing of his
argument is that of democratic instrumentalism.
Instrumentalists tend to share Cain’s view that the
best form of democracy is not one that perfectly
embodies an abstract democratic ideal, but one that
does the best in actually promoting the public
good. In section 4, however, I suggest that the instru-
mentalist should not accept Cain’s skeptical conclu-
sion, despite the cogency of his critique of certain
overly idealistic reform efforts. His arguments
against idealistic overreach do not undermine the
possibility of significant improvements to our demo-
cratic political system, especially in light of his own
recognition of significant improvements in the past.
2. REFORM PLURALISM
Cain begins with the observation that Americans
are deeply dissatisfied with the state of their politi-
cal system. But he warns against ‘‘corruption confu-
sion,’’ arguing that there is relatively little direct
material corruption in the U.S. political system
(162–163). Rather, the corruption that underlies
our dissatisfaction is the ‘‘democratic distortion’’
resulting from the institutional perversion of demo-
cratic aims or the systematic undermining of demo-
cratic principles (164). For many reformers—whom
Cain calls ‘‘populists’’—the worry about demo-
cratic distortion is grounded in the arguably quintes-
sential democratic value, mentioned already, that all
individuals should have equal influence over the
political process: ‘‘The populist reformer aspires
to apply the ‘one person, one vote’ equality princi-
ple across all dimensions of political influence,
empowering individual citizens with equal oppor-
tunities to contribute to campaigns, acquire infor-
mation from the government, observe decisions
and remove officials they do not like’’ (7). On this
view, as long as some of us have more influence
than others, there is reason for democratic reform.
The resulting practical impulse among populists,
which Cain labels the ‘‘democratic imperative,’’ is
toward ‘‘more opportunities for citizens to observe,
participate in and control their government’s actions,’’
approaching something like a plebiscitary democracy
of unmediated majoritarian control over political
decisions (7).
The problem, Cain argues, is that the populist
response to democratic dissatisfaction is plagued
by theoretical and practical difficulties, and much
of the book pursues the critical task of showing
how the populist approach fails. Among the theoret-
ical difficulties is identifying what counts as demo-
cratic distortion in the first place. For instance,
there are many compelling conceptions of fair-
ness, procedural and substantive, that are not all
capable of being instantiated together. Why should
equality of influence be the unique democratic
fairness concern when majoritarian procedures
may threaten a tyranny of the majority? Similarly,
the populist drive toward greater participation and
transparency must be balanced against other dem-
ocratic values, such as deliberation and the effec-
tive representation of interests. There is no single
weighting of these goods that is obviously most
democratic.
Despite these difficulties, Cain accepts that his-
torical democratic developments have established
a universally recognized threshold or ‘‘lower bound-
ary’’ (18) for basic democratic accountability, con-
stituted by universal suffrage, periodic elections,
and the provision of certain basic rights including
freedom of speech and freedom of association.
These are settled matters and, for the reform plural-
ist, meeting these threshold conditions is sufficient
for democratic legitimacy. The challenge facing
democratic reformers is whether any reforms are
required above this democratic legitimacy thresh-
old, in what Cain calls the ‘‘democratic interval’’
(18). Partly because of the theoretical difficul-
ties just described, however, reform pluralists are
skeptical about any further specification of what
democratic legitimacy requires. The pluralist rather
embraces the thought that theoretical differences
are themselves subject to political compromise,
with democratic developments worked out by inter-
est groups themselves in real time. This may leave
our political system looking like an awkward or
even incoherent balancing of various democratic
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values—and it makes the question of democratic
distortion much more complicated—but that is all
that we can reasonably expect or want. As a result,
reformers should not buy into any one ideal of
democracy as a blueprint for reform efforts.
Cain’s skepticism carries over to practical mat-
ters, where he argues that the American political
system has structural constraints that severely
limit the short-term reform agenda, including a con-
stitution that is near-impossible to amend and which
enshrines certain representative institutions anath-
ema to majoritarian impulses, as well as a Supreme
Court that has upheld a strong view on First Amend-
ment liberties and campaign spending despite the
resulting inequality of influence on the political pro-
cess. This last constraint forces us to accept that
moneyed interests will not simply be regulated
away in favor of the populist ideal of perfect equal-
ity of influence.
Cain criticizes populist reform efforts in two
main ways: they either undermine their own stated
goals or they succeed only by undermining some
other equally important democratic value. Thus,
for example: in trying to maximize citizen participa-
tion, reformers may actually overburden and turn
off citizens; or in focusing too much on transparency,
reformers may damage democratic deliberation that
requires some breathing room; or in establishing an
initiative process to promote direct democracy,
reformers may simply provide special interests a
new tool to control and exploit the political system;
or in setting up citizen oversight bodies, reformers
may simply create a new delegation that must be
held accountable and is susceptible to the same
interests as the previous arrangement—Cain calls
this last problem the ‘‘delegation paradox’’ (7–9).
But the general, underlying practical problem with
populist proposals is that they expect too much of
average citizens and their representatives: ‘‘the ques-
tions that are not asked frequently enough, despite
decades of empirical research on this topic [citations
omitted], are whether individual citizens have the
resources, motivation and capacity to undertake
these new civic opportunities, and if not, what does
this mean for the design of effective reforms?’’
(7). We cannot reasonably expect the electorate to
consistently exhibit the intelligence and public-
spiritedness necessary to make the populists’ ideal
participatory systems work. Nor can we expect
our representatives to be impartial judges. Human
beings will always suffer from cognitive and sym-
pathetic deficiencies. This perhaps explains why
Cain makes no mention of long-term reform possi-
bilities through public education. He does not seri-
ously entertain the thought that the quality of our
democracy might improve over time by improving
the qualities of the citizens themselves.
Unlike the populist, Cain argues that we must
operate within our historical, Madisonian system
designed to balance coalitions of competing inter-
ests through a variety of checks and balances. In try-
ing to accommodate the ‘‘democratic imperative,’’
then, the pluralist aims only to ‘‘make the proxy rep-
resentation of citizens by interest groups, nonprof-
its, political parties and other intermediaries as
fair and effective as possible’’ (6). Fortunately, the
pluralist argues, our Madisonian system of repre-
sentative and divided government offers a prag-
matic approach to democratic accountability that
meets the democratic legitimacy threshold by bal-
ancing those coalitions of interest groups without
giving any of them a permanent institutional advan-
tage. Bearing in mind the constraints of the Ameri-
can democratic system, Cain finally endorses a
handful of minor, incremental reforms, including:
ensuring that all citizens’ votes are treated equally
at the ballot box, with uniform rules governing
how votes are cast and counted; introducing rules
for semi-disclosure of campaign donations in which
identities are not revealed but other relevant voter
data might be made public so that citizens could
see who is behind candidates and policy proposals;
and rather than limiting campaign spending, trying
to find ways to provide public funding to candidates
that otherwise could not compete with privately
funded campaigns.
With apologies to the nuances of Cain’s argu-
ments, reform pluralism can be summarized in four
claims. (1) Certain threshold democratic accountabil-
ity features are necessary and sufficient for political
legitimacy. (2) Any effort to improve a democracy
above that threshold by single-mindedly reforming
one aspect of the democratic system—in particular,
increased citizen participation—is bound to have
perverse consequences. (3) The fact of citizens’
cognitive and motivational limitations entails that
any democratic reforms requiring people to partici-
pate significantly in legislation or governance are
bound to fail. (4) Reform efforts should be limited
to (a) protecting the basic democratic threshold fea-
tures and (b) securing a fair playing field for com-
peting interest groups in society.
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3. THREE FRAMEWORKS
FOR PLURALISM
In evaluating reform pluralism, I want to focus on
how the lower boundary—the basic democratic
legitimacy threshold—is justified. Cain acknowl-
edges that the lower boundary of democratic
accountability has changed over time:
In the earliest periods of American history, the
electorate did not include women, minorities
and younger voters. Senators were selected
by state legislatures, and presidential nomina-
tions were controlled by party caucuses and
elected officials. Citizens had no freedom of
information rights or open meeting laws to
assist them in figuring out what the govern-
ment had done or was planning to do. It
was truly a minimal democracy, not one
that would be deemed sufficiently democratic
today. (14)
He adds that the ‘‘boundary between democracy
and nondemocracy is.dynamic over time’’ (14).
What should we make of these claims? On one
hand, Cain seems to allow that the basic democratic
legitimacy threshold has changed over time, and for
the better. On the other hand, we saw earlier his
argument that there is little reason to expect future
reform efforts to lead to any significant improve-
ments in the quality of our democracy.
Presumably, however, earlier changes to the dem-
ocratic threshold resulted from reform efforts that
were pursued when the basic elements of the plural-
ist picture—competing interest groups and cogni-
tively and motivationally limited citizens—were
also in effect. It is important to appreciate that
Cain does not provide a general argument for why
improvements in the basic democratic threshold
are less likely now than before. He argues effec-
tively for the much more limited claim that specific
reform efforts inspired by single-minded populism
are likely to have perverse effects. But, in order to
secure the pluralist’s reform skepticism, he needs
to show that the theoretical and practical difficulties
facing less single-minded and idealistic reform
efforts are greater today than in the past.
Consider three simplified frameworks that
accommodate both Cain’s acceptance of the current
democratic legitimacy threshold and his skepticism
about improvements beyond it. One natural way of
making sense of the pluralist approach is to regard it
as a form of political realism that recognizes a wide-
spread commitment to basic democratic account-
ability mechanisms but rejects the moral impulse
toward reform. Call this democratic realism. The
democratic realist accepts the significance of the
democratic threshold for providing stability and
the balance of interests, and argues that political
reformers must respect the sociological fact that
there is a near-universal acceptance of those legiti-
macy conditions in Western democracies. But the
realist does not emphasize the moral value of that
threshold (or of potential improvements to it), and
resists reforms that might threaten the stability it
provides.
Though some of what Cain writes seems to be in
the democratic realist mode, it is doubtful that he is
a thoroughgoing realist. Certainly, the pluralist’s
disdain for ideal theory sometimes evokes the real-
ist’s antipathy to idealistic reformers. And like the
realist, Cain does not provide much in the way of
guiding moral principles. But his acceptance of
the democratic threshold does seem to be a moral
commitment, and not merely an acknowledgment
of sociological fact.
A second way of making sense of the pluralist
approach would be to adopt a public reason frame-
work in which the legitimacy of state coercion is
understood in terms of what can be justified to all
reasonable citizens.4 On this view, the democratic
threshold would be defined by whatever is publicly
justified and it may change over time. But the pub-
lic reason pluralist—who is skeptical of political
reform—could also argue that advocating for
changes to the status quo at any given time might
endanger the currently publicly justified order.
The democratic threshold recognized at any partic-
ular time would have moral significance in virtue of
its being justified to all reasonable citizens. But the
public reason pluralist might resist, on related moral
grounds, any changes that would threaten the pub-
licly justified order.5
4See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993).
5Gerald Gaus argues that, given the great value of an equilib-
rium on social rules, there must be a strong bias toward the sta-
tus quo in any realistic public reason theory. See Gerald F.
Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011).
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This kind of view has its attractions, but I think it
also does not capture Cain’s own thinking. Instead,
he writes, ‘‘Democracies must produce good out-
comes for their citizens in a utilitarian sense. To
be sure, an election is an imperfect welfare calculus
and tool for promoting governance, but it is the
foundation of democratic design’’ (15). Like Madi-
son, Cain seems to justify his claims ultimately in
terms of what conduces to the public good.
The third way of making sense of Cain’s plural-
ism, then, is by appeal to democratic instrumental-
ism, according to which democratic institutions
have value only insofar as they conduce to the pub-
lic good (suitably characterized). An advantage of
this account is that it neatly explains Cain’s basic
difference with populist reformers. Unlike the pop-
ulist, the instrumentalist is not ultimately concerned
with making our system perfectly democratic (along
some dimension), but with making our imperfect
democracy as effective as possible in promoting
the public good. On an instrumentalist view, Cain
argues for skeptical practical conclusions because
theoretical and practical difficulties make it unlikely
that populist democratic reforms will do better than
the Madisonian system in promoting the good. We
may need to tinker with our democracy to keep it
running smoothly within its Madisonian limits, and
of course we should guard against any major threats
to basic democratic legitimacy, but that is about it.
Trying to do more than that, guided by some demo-
cratic ideal, is bound to lead to worse outcomes.
Let us assume that even a more optimistic instru-
mentalist would agree with Cain that those who aim
to maximize democracy—and who hold that gov-
ernment legitimacy hangs on meeting idealized
democratic conditions—are mistaken. More democ-
racy need not always be better democracy, and dem-
ocratic legitimacy should not be tied to the
achievement of some maximal populist ideal. But
setting Cain’s pluralism in an instrumentalist setting
also opens it up to a clear challenge from the opti-
mist. For if better democracy is cashed out in
terms of conduciveness to the public good, then
the optimist may argue that Cain has failed to
make the case that we can do no better—above
the current democratic threshold conditions—than
just to tinker with our Madisonian system. In reject-
ing the single-minded pursuit of populist aims, Cain
has not shown that piecemeal and balanced—but
still significant—democratic changes could not
raise the democratic threshold in the future.
4. ROOM FOR REFORM
In the context of democratic instrumentalism, the
question of whether Cain’s pessimism about demo-
cratic reform is justified is an empirical one. He
argues convincingly that in the near term there are
constitutional constraints on what can be achieved:
[R]eform occurs within a general constitu-
tional framework that is rarely challenged
and nearly impossible to change at the federal
level. Politically feasible reforms necessarily
take the separation of powers, federalism, per-
meable bureaucracy, court review, strong First
Amendment tradition, political professional-
ism, and suspicion of power as givens. To do
otherwise is politically naı¨ve and utopian.
But the decision to do what is possible—a
second-best strategy—has significant conse-
quences for the form and effectiveness of
reform efforts. (39)
But it is striking that rather than call for long-
term reform efforts to amend the constitution or to
educate the citizenry or to develop new democratic
institutions, he simply concludes that we must work
within those constraints indefinitely. With a long
view, an optimistic instrumentalist has room to
argue that it is worth attempting a variety of demo-
cratic experiments to see what improvements for
posterity might result. These efforts must be balanced
rather than single-minded, and most experiments will
fail, but Cain seems to move too quickly from the
failure of populist over-idealization and single-mind-
edness to the claim that even piecemeal reforms are
unlikely ever to constitute significant improvements
over the Madisonian system. For instance, the fact
that maximizing citizen participation across the polit-
ical system will have perverse consequences is not an
argument against increasing citizen participation
here and there, and the fact that we can never fully
rein in the influence of moneyed interests on politics
is not an argument against partial measures to change
incentives. Over time these changes might have sig-
nificant effects on the quality of our democracy as an
instrument to promote the public good.
It seems that pluralism—like political realism—
overreacts to utopian thinking with unnecessary
hard-headedness. Many earlier reformers were
also overly idealistic—one need only think of the
many experimental communities of the late
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nineteenth century—but some of their efforts over
time resulted in real improvements that were suc-
cessfully adopted within the existing political
system. It is certainly difficult to predict which
reform efforts might lead to further improvements.
Perhaps most of them will fail. But I do not see
any less reason now than before to believe that
some of them could lead to important improvements
in our democratic system.
Evaluating the success of these democratic
experiments presents its own challenge. But note
that, in the context of democratic instrumentalism,
we are no longer trying to measure how democratic
a system is—with all the theoretical difficulties
Cain highlights—but rather how well a political sys-
tem promotes the public good. Recent years have
seen a rise in the development of indices to measure
effectively the average quality of life or happiness
of citizens in different countries. These provide a
foothold to evaluate different political systems
above the democratic threshold.6
Cain’s long-term skepticism hinges on his view
of human limitations. That is what fundamentally
seems to stand in the way of his moving away
from the Madisonian vision. On his view, any
more rationalistic picture of democratic processes
is bound to demand too much either of our cognitive
abilities or of our capacity for impartial judgment.
Such rationalistic reforms would thus tend toward
worse outcomes than the messy but workable
give-and-take of the current system.
But I am optimistic that even though people are
not perfectible we are still improvable and that
changes in social conditions over time may do a
great deal to foster an ideal of citizenship in
which individuals are expected to have a more dis-
interested concern for others. In this respect, it is
interesting how far Cain has shifted away from
his instrumentalist predecessor, John Stuart Mill.
Mill believed that over time individuals could be
improved through education and could develop pub-
lic spirit to a much greater extent than they exhibit
currently. This belief made it possible to imagine
a democratic system relying to some degree on citizens’
impartial regard for the public good, rather than for
their own self-interest.7 As a result, he remained
open to a host of practical democratic proposals.
Mill may have been too optimistic in this respect.
But the long-term question for our reform efforts
now is not whether there are limits to human
moral and intellectual improvement—there surely
are—but whether we have reached them yet. Given
historical social improvements, which Cain himself
acknowledges, I believe we still have strong reason
to engage with the difficult long-term project of
developing a better culture of democratic citizenship.
5. CONCLUSION
By adopting a democratic instrumentalist frame-
work, Cain is able to get critical leverage on popu-
lists focused exclusively on making our democracy
as democratic as possible. If we focus too much on
having more rather than better democracy, we run
into significant theoretical and practical difficulties.
Cain’s book is invaluable for making this case as
comprehensively as one could hope, based on
masses of empirical evidence. But the instrumental-
ist account of better democracy also gives us reason
to believe that significant reform efforts remain
worth pursuing, for the simple reason that some of
them have worked in the past.
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